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The eight-year history of operating securities markets in China without formal national
legislation' finally ended when the long-awaited Securities Law of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) was adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
(NPC) on December 29, 1998. The law entered into force on July 1, 1999. The enactment
has also punctuated the long legislative history of the law.2 As such, the development has
cheered some officials,' scholars, 4 and practitioners.5
The Securities Law has made some records in the legislative history of the PRC. First,
because of serious controversies the draft law failed four times in six and a half years in the
national legislature's examination; second, the passage surprised many by receiving no dis-
senting votes, which is unprecedented; and third, a law was drafted for the first time in the
*Xian Chu Zhang is Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, at the University of Hong Kong.
1. It would be incorrect to say that the Chinese securities markets have run without law. For example, the
legal rules governing the securities markets have been recently compiled by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) into a five-volume collection entitled ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONHHEGUO ZHENGQUAN
QIHUO FAGUI HUIBIAN [COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON SECURITIES AND FUTURES OF PRC] (1992-
1997) (1997). However, almost all of these rules are adopted by the branches of government, rather than the
national legislature, on a provisional basis.
2. The first drafting group was formed in as early as July 1992. For a brief discussion of the legislative
history, see DONG SIAOP EG, ZHONGGUO GuSHI ZHENGCE HE CHAOGU [CIlNA'S SECURITIES MARKET POLICY
AND MARKET SPECULATION], M. P., 99-108 (1997).
3. The Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, Li Peng, stated that the law would play an
important role in guaranteeing the healthy development of China's fledgling securities market. Foo Choy Peng
& Christine Chan, BeiingApproves First National Securities Law, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 30, 1998,
at B2.
4. Professor Li Yining and Professor Cao Fengqi, both being the members of the drafting group, believe
that the promulgation brings good news to the market. See MING PAO, Dec. 30, 1998, atB15; ZHONGGuOGAIGE
BAO (CHINA'S REFORM JOURNAL), Oct. 24, 1998, at 5.
5. Some traders from leading securities firms consider that the adoption would help to make a more orderly
market over the long term. See Long-awaited Securities Law Gets Go-ahead, HONG KONG STANDARD, Dec. 30,
1998, at BI.
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PRC legislative history by experts and scholars, instead of government branches.6 However,
the enactment apparently does not end the political and technical wrangling over the se-
curities market regulation. For instance, some significant changes could not be worked out
until the last days before the voting;7 the markets in both Shanghai and Shenzhen reacted
to the legislation with over 1.5 percent drops on the same day;8 and the deep caution of
investors soon sent market turnover to its lowest level in two yearsY Some securities firms
and analysts openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the legislation.l °
Against this backdrop, this article examines the progress made by the Securities Law to
the existing regulatory framework, its practical impacts, and the problems yet to be solved.
Part I provides an introductionto the new legislation by highlighting the basic character-
istics of the securities market in China and some fundamental problems that needed to be
addressed by the law. Part II reviews the major provisions of the law, Part II discusses legal
liability, Part IV examines the progress made by the law, and Part V discusses some unsettled
issues and conditions to be improved. Finally, Part VI draws some conclusions. Based on
the analyses, the article argues that the first Securities Law of PRC, although upgrading
the market regulation in a positive direction, achieves only limited breakthrough and falls
short of many expectations. As such, the enactment may be considered merely a transitional
measure toward an effective regulatory framework under market disciplines.
I. Introduction
The securities market in mainland China was re-established after 1949 when the Shang-
hai Exchange opened on December 19, 1990, followed by the Shenzhen on July 3, 1991.
It has developed rapidly since then. By December 29, 1998, 851 companies were listed in
two exchanges with a market value of RMB 1.96 trillion." The total capitalization at the
end of 1997 was RMB 283.4 billion including RMB 116 billion foreign investment. 2 In
addition, China funded companies have been successfully listed in foreign markets, includ-
ing Hong Kong, New York, Singapore, and Sydney.
Along with the rapid market development, the legal infrastructure has also been con-
structed at a swift pace. According to Professor Li Yining, the leader of the drafting group,
before the adoption of the Securities Law, 251 pieces of enactment were promulgated. They
have formed a solid basis for the unified national legislation." Among them, Company Law
6. See WANG LIANZHOU, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHENGQUAN FA SHIYI [THE SECURITIES LAW OF
THE PRC-AN ANNOTATION] 2-3 (1999).
7. See Six More Changes Have Been Made to the Draft Securities Law; MING PAso, Dec. 29, 1998, at A14.
8. A-Share Indexes in Shanghai and Shenzhen dropped 1.51 and 1.67 after the law was passed on the
morning of Dec. 29, 1998. See Foo Choy Peng & Christine Chan, Debate Ends as Beijing Adopts Securities Law,
SoUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 30, 1998, at B1-2.
9. See Foo Choy Peng & Christine Chan, Turnover Slumps as Law Creates Caution, SoUTH CHINA MORNING
PosT, Jan. 5, 1999, at B4.
10. For example, some securities practitioners believe that the law, by over-emphasizing protection of in-
vestors, overlooks the interests of securities firms altogether. See MING PAO, supra note 4, at BI5. See also
Stephen Seawright, Securities Law to Have Little Effect, HONG KONG STANDARD, Dec. 30, 1998, at B3.
11. See Current Financial Situation of China, RENMiN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Jan. 4, 1999.
12. See Zhuo Zhengqing, Rang Shijie liaojie Zhongguo Zhengquang Shichang /Let World Know Chinese Securities
Market], RENMIN RIRAO HAIWAI BAN [PEoPLE'S DAILY, OVERSEAS EDITION],Jan. 2, 1999, at 3.
13. See Jingxun Shuju [Accurate Data] of Nov. 12, 1998: Li Yining, Adoption of Securities Law (visited
Oct. 6, 1999) <http://www.chinainfobank.com>.
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of 1993 (Company Law) and the Interim Regulations on Stock Issuing and Trading of 1993
(IRSIT) are the most important ones that have been actively applied in the market regulation.
Since 1992, two state authorities have primarily regulated the Chinese securities market.
The State Council Securities Committee (SCSC) was established for administration of the
market at the macro-level with the powers to promulgate decrees and provisions, to for-
mulate policies and development plans, and to guide, coordinate, and inspect markets of
different regions.
14
The SCSC is composed of fourteen state organs, including the People's Bank, the State
Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the State Asset Administration Bureau, and
the Supreme People's Court. On the lower tier is the China Securities Regulatory Com-
mission (CSRC), which was formed with officials and securities experts as the executive
branch of the SCSC to carry out concrete supervision and regulation of the market as well
as securities firms.
15
Despite the noticeable progress covering a long distance within a short period, the Chi-
nese securities market has distinguished itself from other jurisdictions with its unique char-
acteristics. Unlike many other securities markets where the sole purpose is to provide the
public with an efficient and dependable mechanism through which securities can be bought
and sold,16 the fundamental function of the Chinese securities market has been to serve the
economic goal of the state by extricating the government from continuing to subsidize the
deeply troubled state owned enterprises (SOEs). 17 Presently, although the state sector re-
mains the major driving force of the national economy, 8 its heavy loss has rendered the
government unable to finance it.' 9 As such, the securities market in China is open to raise
funds for SOEs and to promote a so-called socialist economy.2 0
The government has closely controlled both issuing and listing of securities. With regard
to issuing of stocks, the requirement of minimum actually paid-in registered capital of RMB
10 million,2" or net assets of RMB 30 million in case of corporate debenture issuing,22
14. See Notice of the State Council Concerning Further Strengthening Macro-administration of the Se-
curities Market of December 17, 1992, Item 1(1).
15. See id., Item 1(2).
16. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM. OF THE U.S.: REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS
or 1963, reprinted in RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION-CASES AND MA-
TERiALs, 2 Foundation Press, Inc. 1987 (6th ed.).
17. See Robert Nuttle, The Development of tbe Securities Market in China in 1990s, 11 COMPANYAND SECURITIES
L.J. 503, 503 (1993).
18. The state sector still accounts for one-third of production, over one-half of total assets, two-thirds of
urban employment, and almost three-quarters of state investment. See World Bank Report No. 16265, China's
Management of Enterprise Assets: The State as Shareholder (1997) at I (visited Oct. 6, 1999)
<www.worldbank.org/pics/econ/1 16265>.
19. Since 1996 when the state sector first recorded a net loss since the economic reform starting at the end
of 1970s, the situation has become even worse. According to the latest statistics, in the first 11 months of 1998,
the loss of the state sector has reached RMB 80 billion, 36.3% up from the same period of last year. The loss-
making firms have made 49% of all state industrial enterprises. MIND PAo, Dec. 29, 1998, at A14. Dai Xiang-
long, the President of the People's Bank has openly admitted that the unperforming debts of the state com-
mercial banks had amounted to 25% of their total lending. CHINA ECON. NEws, Mar. 9, 1998, at 3.
20. Mr. Liu Hongru, Address at SCSC in New York (Jan. 24, 1994). Quoted in Henry M.K. Mok & Zhou
Daozhi, Economic and Securities Market, in SECURITIES MARKET IN CHINA (Hong Kong 1997), at 29-30.
21. See Company Law of PRC art. 78.
22. See id., art. 161.
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effectively eliminates almost all private enterprises from having access to securities markets.
Moreover, the purpose of any proposed issuing must be in line with the state industrial
policy13 and supported by governmental authorities at both local and central levels.24 Fur-
ther, any issuing is subject to the state annual quota. For example, article 164 of the Com-
pany Law states that the annual volume of corporate debenture issuing shall be determined
by the State Council. The actual issuing approved by the securities authority may not exceed
the limit of the State Council. In 1993, the SCSC even ordered to suspend any new issuing
of stocks until the state treasury bonds of the year were fully subscribed." Furthermore,
the state examination of any issuing application has been a substantive scrutiny of various
kinds of the issuer's records, such as the profit and lawful operation history.16 Last but not
least, an issuing is also subject to many other state regulations. For instance, a SOE must
be approved by the state authority concerned for its incorporation27 and its asset appraisal
must be approved by the State Asset Administration Bureau.2" In case of listing, the stan-
dards are even higher.2"
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that almost all the listed companies are trans-
formed from SOEs. Currently, in two-thirds of such companies, the holdings of the state
or state-owned legal persons amount to sixty to seventy percent 0 whereas stocks owned by
private investors account for only 2 5.7 percent of the securities market.' As such, although
many SOEs have been transformed into the modern business form, they remain under the
government's control and influence, rather than the market discipline. For example, in
addition to statutory organs as provided by the Company Law (including shareholders'
meetings, boards of directors, and supervisory boards), grass root committees of the Com-
munist Party and the trade unions as the pillars of SOEs' governance still exist side by side
with them in most listed companies. Most members and chairmen of boards of directors
and general managers are still appointed by government authorities.32 As Mr. Liu Hongru
admitted, presently "most of listed companies in the mainland China have not met the
requirements of the Company Law.""
23. See art. 8 IRSIT (describing stock issuing); see also art. 161 (4) (describing corporate debenture issuing)
Company Law of PRC.
24. See IRSIT arts. 77, 84, 139, 164, 12, 13, 14.
25. Item 2 of the Notice of the SCSC Concerning Stock Issuing and Subscription for the Year of 1993 on
August 18, 1993.
26. See IRSIT art. 8.
27. See, e.g., the Interim Provisions on Macro-administration Measures over Enterprise Incorporation on
Trial Basis jointly issued by the State Planning Commission and the State Commission of Economic System
Reform on June 15, 1992.
28. See, e.g., Chapter 6 entitled Asset Appraisal of Incorporation of (State Owned) Enterprises of Imple-
menting Rules of State Owned Asset Appraisal Measures issued by the State Asset Administration Bureau on
July 18, 1992.
29. Among other things, a listed company, in addition to the approvals of the state authorities at different
levels, must have minimum paid-in capital of RMB 50 million, a minimum operation history of three years
without any major violation, and a profit record for recent executive three years. See Company Law of PRC
art. 152.
30. State Owns Too Big in Listed Companies-An Interview with Liu Shaobo of Guangdong SecuritiesAssociation,
CHINA Econ. News, Nov. 10, 1997, at 6-7.
31. See Xiao Zhuoji, The Development of the Chinese Securities Market, in Economic and Securities Market,
supra note 20, at 77.
32. SeeJIN BEI: HEQOu HECONG-DANGDAI ZHONGGUO OR Guovu QrE WENTI "¥sHERE To Go-CoNTEM-
PORARY PROBLEMS OF STATE OwNED ErERPRISES IN CHINA], at 217-230 (1997).
33. Liu, cited in Economic and Securities Market, supra note 20, at 46.
VOL. 33, NO. 4
FIRST SECURITIES LAW OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 987
To further protect the state interest, the Chinese securities market has been irrationally
divided from the very beginning. Common stocks issued and traded domestically are sepa-
rated into A shares for domestic investors and B shares for foreign investors exclusively 4
Soon after two Japanese auto makers purchased A shares of Beijing Lightbus Co. from some
domestic legal persons in 1995,31 the CSRC issued a circular to suspend foreign acquisition
of A shares held by the state or any legal persons on the ground that without sufficient legal
protection, state assets might be lost in such transactions.'6 In 1996, Guanghua Co., a
Shanghai listed company, was penalized with a trading suspension for a transfer of its shares
from its state holder to an American company. The ban was again vigorously reiterated by
the SCRC.3' Thus, although the law provides the principle of equal shares for equal rights
and equal benefits,"l a defacto inequity has long existed between A and B shareholders that
creates the unequal access to information, unequal liquidity, unequal prices, and unequal
formalities of transfer.
3 9
A shares are further divided according to ownership into state shares, legal person shares
which are held by state owned firms, and individual shares. The law prohibits any transfer
of state shares without the approval of the state authorities concerned.4 As a result, the
trading of the Chinese securities market only refers to the transactions of A shares among
private investors, B shares, and overseas listed stocks, which altogether represent approxi-
mately 34.4 percent of the total issued common stocks of listed companies. In terms of
domestic A share trading alone, the figure further decreases to twenty percent.4 1 Many have
argued that creating the share structure hierarchy and subjecting investors to different sets
of regulations not only defeats the corporate finance function of securities markets, but also
violates the principle of share equality,42 the political reason for such a division to protect
state ownership still held in China. Further reflecting such ideological concerns, the Com-
pany Law is entirely silent on the fundamental issue of minority protection and the current
regulation prohibits any domestic individual from holding more than 0.5 percent of the
outstanding common stocks of any listed company.
4t
34. Under the current regulation, B shares are domestically listed and traded foreign capital stocks which
shall only be held by foreign investors including those from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. See PROVISIONS
CONCERNING FOREIGN CAPITAL SHARES LISTED WITHIN THE MAINLAND PROMULGATED BY THE STATE COUNCIL,
arts. 3, 4 (Dec. 25, 1995).
35. For a discussion of the transaction, see generally COLE R. CAPENER, A GUIDEBOOK TO MERGERS AND
ACQUISITION IN CHINA, 71 (1996).
36. See CSRC's Report to the State Council Concerning Suspension of Transfer of Shares of Listed Com-
panies Held by the State and Legal Persons to Foreign Business Concerns, (Sept. 23, 1995).
37. See CSRC News Release, Jan. 25, 1996, reprinted in SoNG YANLU AND GAO TIANSU (ED.): ZENYANG CHULI
JINRONG JIUFEN [HOW TO DEAL WITH FINANCIAL DIsPTrrEs], 475 (1997).
38. See Company Law, art. 130.
39. For a comment, see Zhang Xian Chu, Legislative Reform of B Share Regulation in China, 1 AsIA PACIFIC
LAw REVIEW 24, 24-36 (1996), William D. Holmes, China's Financial Reforms in the GlobalMarket. Commen-
tators including U.S. SEC Commissioner Leavitt even consider B share issuers to have a tendency to "take the
money and run," 28 LAW & POL. IN INT'L BUS. 715, 762-763 (1997).
40. See IRSIT art. 36 (further stating that transfer of state shares shall not harm the rights and the interests
of the state).
41. See Liu Hongru, Capital Market and Enterprise Reform; Economic and Securities Market, supra note 20,
at 45.
42. See CHENGXI YAo, STOCK MARKET AND FUTURES MARKET IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 20 (1998);
see also K. Matthew Wong, Securities Regulations in China and Their Corporate Finance Implications on State En-
terprise Reform, 4 FoROHAM L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1996).
43. See IRSIT art. 46.
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As a result of such conditions, the securities market in China has been highly speculative
since thirty-seven million private investors, or ninety percent shareholders on the market
in China, have little incentive for long term investment. A recent study shows that the
Chinese market has the highest turnover rate in the world with each stock changing hands
eight times a year." To make the situation even worse, many SOEs and listed companies
have joined risky speculation with state funds, bank loans, or public investors' money for
quick profit. The wave did not relax until the government issued a circular strictly banning
such practices with severe financial and administrative penalties. 41
At the same time, the normal practice to provide finance to investors by securities firms
in other jurisdictions has also been disallowed in China. Virtually all of the securities firms
in China were connected or subordinate to state commercial banks when the People's Bank
was named the state supervisor of their operations. 46 After the implementation of the Com-
mercial Bank Law of 1995, which prohibits commercial banks from engaging in trust in-
vestment and securities business, 47 the state banks have been required to disconnect with
their trust investment and securities firms completely,4s and banks have been banned from
financing any securities investment.49 Such a prohibition as a long-term government policy
is to prevent financial risk and, more importantly, to ensure that limited state financial
resources be used in state primary projects. However, the implementation has met resis-
tance. Some heads of bank branches have been dismissed,1° and several securities firms have
been penalized for violations.5
Based on the aforementioned differences, it has been observed that "securities markets
in China do not remove enterprises from state control, or provide capitalism in a Western
sense. Their effect and purpose is to preserve and enhance the socialist order .... "I2
The deep involvement of the government has also lead to various corrupt practices and
violations. Public issuing and listing, as a scarce resource to access to public financial mar-
kets, is subject to the state annual quota. Thus, they become the battlegrounds of state
44. See Liao Shiming, Shenhu Gushi Huanshou Lu Quanqiu Zuigao IThe Turnover Rate of the Securities Markets
in Shanghai and Shenzhen is the Highest in the World], XINBAO [HONG KONG FINANCIAL JOURNAL], July 9, 1998,
at 30. A World Bank study reached the same conclusion after comparing the ratio between the trading volume
and the total market value of the securities market among 19 emerging market countries, WORLD BANK, CHINA
2020: DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN THE NEW CENTURY 34 (1997).
45. See The Notice of the State Council to Transfer of the Provisions Issued by the SCSC, the People's
Bank and the State Commission of Economy and Trade Jointly Concerning Strictly Prohibition of Stock
Speculation by State Owned Enterprises and Listed Companies (May21, 1997) describing penalties thatinclude
confiscation, fine, and dismissal of persons responsible for the violation.
46. See Notice of the State Council, supra note 14, Item 1(3).
47. See Commercial Bank Law, art. 43.
48. See NOTICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL TO TRANSFER THE CIRCULAR OF THE PEOPLE'S BANK CONCERNING
DISCONNECTION OF ENTRUST INVESTMENT COMPANIES WITH THEIR PARENT STATE BANKS (May 25, 1998).
49. See NOTICE OF THE PEOPLE'S BANK CONCERNING STRICT CONTROL OF LENDING AND STRENGTHENING OF
LOAN ADMINISTRATION (Sept. 9, 1994) (stipulating that banks shall not support any real estate, stocks, and any
other securities investment).
50. For example, two heads of state bank branches were penalized for their violation. See RENMIN RIBAO
[PEOPLE'S DAILY], Nov. 15, 1996.
51. For example, two securities firms were warned and fined with 5 % of the illegal financing; some persons
directly responsible for the violation were also warned. See ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECUsRITIEs],
Nov. 19, 1996.
52. See Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese Securities Law, 1 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 115, 125 (1996).
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departments and local governments for enterprises within their jurisdictions. As a result,
deployment of personal relations and other corrupt means are no longer a secret.53 The
combination of the tight government control, uncertain and foggy procedures, and personal
involvement of high level officials has earned the reputation for the Chinese securities
market as a "policy market" and "news market" for a long time.54 As a Chinese scholar
states in his recent book, insider trading and manipulation of the market have been con-
ducted almost half-openly in China" with the involvement of high level officials5° and
powerful securities firms with strong government background."
In such an environment, many SOEs have also abused the process of issuing and listing
by rigging up their poor assets and performance to defraud investors. In a case recently
dealt with by the SCRC, in order to be qualified for listing a company rewrote its losses of
RMB 103 million in 1996 as a profit of RMB 54 million. In the 1997 annual report as its
first year of listing, it again made a false report to cover the fact that RMB 230 million, or
55.9 percent of its capitalization from the issuing, had been lost. In addition to the failure
to disclose some significant incidents in the two years, certain criminal activities were under
further investigation.58 The case well illustrates the extensive violations on the market and
the condition of unsatisfactory enforcement.5 9
However, in paving the way for adoption of the Securities Law, some encouraging
progress has recently been made. Following the promulgation of the IRSIT, many other
important regulations were adopted to fill the regulatory loopholes.60 Particularly, the
revised Criminal Law of 1997 explicitly criminalized insider trading, making and dis-
seminating false information, and manipulation of the securities market. The law provides
for fines, detention, or imprisonment up to ten years for violations of its provisions.
61
53. It is reported that in some cases, tens of million of RMB will be needed to pay various "gate fees." See
BEI, supra note 32, at 93.
54. See Cao Fengqi and Yao Changhui (ed.), ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZousnI [THE Trends of the
CHINESE SECURITIES MARKET], 115 (1994).
55. See Gu XIAORONG, ZHENGQUAN FANZUI YU ZHENGQUAN WEIGUI WEIFA [SECURITIES CRIMES AND VIO-
LATIONS], 25 (1998).
56. For example, the Deputy Director of the SCSC Branch in Shenyang City and also the Director of the
local CSRC were arrested for trading stocks on the inside information they obtained by virtue of their authority.
See Pan Xiling, Chaoke Beige [A Solemn Song of Speculators], 8 ZHONGGuo NoNGMIN [CHINESE FARMERS] 29
(1994). In a more recent case, a vice-chairman of the People's Congress of Hainan Province was sentenced to
five-year imprisonment for accepting bribe shares in exchange for his approval of the companies' listing. 4
ZUIGAo RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO [THE SUPREME PEOPLES COURT BULLETIN] 139-40 (1998).
57. For example, in the so-called "biggest financial scandal," on March 27, 1995 both the Shanghai Securities
Exchange and Wanguo Securities Company (one of the leading securities firms) were involved in insider trading
and manipulation of the state treasury bond market, that led to a market catastrophe with the state loss of at
least over RMB 1 billion on a single day. As a result of the scandal, the general managers of the Exchange
stepped down and the head of the securities firm was sentenced to imprisonment. Recently, another top se-
curities firm, Junan, was closed by the SCRC for various fraudulent violations. See ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN YIE
NrANjtA 1996 [YEARBOOK OF CHINESE SECURITIES BUSINESS 1996], 683 (1996). See also the report in SING TAO
Ro BAo [SING TAO DAILY], Apr. 14, 1995, at A3.
58. The Public Report by the SCRC Concerning the Serious Violations of Hongguang Company, XINHUA SHE [XIN-
HUA NEWS AGENCY], (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.chinainfobank.com>.
59. Despite the tight state control, the ineffective enforcement and violations are prevalent on the securities
market. See Jay Zhe Zhang, Securities Market and Securities Regulation in China, 2 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
557, 626 (1997).
60. See, e.g., PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO PROHIBIT FRAUD ON SECURITIES MARKET OF 1993; DETAILED IMPLE-
MENTATION RULES CONCERNING QUALIFICATIONS OF STAFF OF SECURITIES BUSINESS OF 1995; PROVISIONS ON
PROHIBITING ENTRY INTO SECURITIES MARKET OF 1997.
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Another noticeable example is in the securities regulatory structure. Under the State
Council's approval, the current two tier structure with the SCSC and CSRC will be replaced
with a single unified system where the CSRC is directly subordinate to the State Council
in charge of securities and futures markets of the nation. As such, the CSRC will be re-
structured with thirteen departments having powers that used to belong to the SCSC and
local governments.6 By reducing the bureaucracy and local interests, the reform will have
deep impacts on effective regulation and healthy development of the market.
To conclude, securities business in China has been an industry monopolized by the gov-
ernment. 63 Despite significant achievements in a short period, the partial market system
still has a long way to go to provide liquidity to investors and to function as a disciplinary
mechanism for the efficient allocation of financial resources. 64 Moreover, the further de-
velopment of the Chinese securities market has been threatened by various corrupt prac-
tices, extensive violations, and violent volatility that derive from the defects of the market
structure and regulatory regime. Against this backdrop, in a sense, the Securities Law is
not adopted under a ripe condition with all the concerns being settled, but under the
tremendous pressures for the long delay and more importantly, of the current Asian finan-
cial turmoil.6 s
II. The Main Provisions of the Securities Law
The newly adopted Securities Law has 214 articles in twelve chapters. In terms of number
of articles, the final version has been increased considerably as compared with the draft by
October 1998 with only 156 articles in eleven chapters. 66 However, as far as the content is
concerned, some articles do no more than codify the existing rules included in the IPSIT
and other SCSC regulations. As such, the examination of this section will focus on those
new provisions and major changes that are set out in the law.
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The legislative purposes are stated in article 1 as to standardizing issuing and trading
activities, protecting the lawful rights and interests of investors, safeguarding social and
economic order as well as public interests, and promoting the socialist market economy.
Thus, any issuing and trading activities shall be governed by the principles of openness,
fairness, and justice.61
The law will govern issuing and trading of stocks, company bonds, and other securities
determined by the State Council within China. Issuing and trading of state treasury bonds
61. Criminal Law arts. 180, 181 and 182 (1997).
62. SeeA Standard CSRC to Shape Up, CHINA ECON. NEWS, Nov. 16, 1998, at 3.
63. See Yao, supra note 42, at 74. See also Fang Liufang, Comments, Capital Markets and Financial Services in
the Pacific Rim: Prospects for Harmonization, 3 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 897 (1997).
64. See Wong, supra note 42, at 1223.
65. See Matthew Cosans, A Capital Market: Recent Market Turmoil May Help Spur Legal Reform in China's
Securities Markets, HONG KONG ACCT., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 53-54. The World Bank has also noted that several
crucial aspects of the Chinese securities market required codified rules. See WORLD BANK, supra note 44, at 34-
35.
66. See Roman Tomasic, An Overview and Assessment of the Draft Securities Law of the People's Republic of China,
3 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 284, 288 (1998).
67. Securities Law art. 3 (1998).
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will be subject to other special legislation.68 Currently, it has been agreed that the term
"other securities" may include financial bonds, bonds of investment funds, and convertible
debentures.69 Article 4 states that the parties in securities issuing and trading shall have
equal footing and abide by the principles of voluntariness, compensation, honesty, and
trustworthiness.
Article 6 stipulates that the securities industry shall be operated and regulated separately
from banking, trust, and insurance businesses. Firms in these types of business are required
to establish themselves separately. The CSRC, as the organ under the State Council, shall
exercise centralized and unified supervision and regulation over the securities markets of
the nation in accordance with law. It may also establish, and delegate its powers to, local
branches.7o As a result, the two-tier structure of the SCSC and the SCRC as well as the co-
regulation framework by both central and local governments has been replaced with a single
vertical system.
B. SECURITIES ISSUING
Any public issuing of securities must be either authorized or approved by the CSRC.7'
In case of public issuing of stocks, the relevant provisions of the Company Law must be
complied with and the authorization (Hezhun) of the CSRC must be obtained. On the other
hand, issuing of corporate debentures requires CSRC's approval (Pizhun). The CSRC shall
establish an issuing examination committee, which is composed of both CSRC professionals
and outside experts, to formulate its examination opinion by voting,72 subject to the CSRC's
final approval through open proceedings." The decision shall be made by the CSRC or
other authorities designated by the State Council within three months of its receipt of the
issuing application.14 However, the law does not specify the legal standards and difference
between authorization and approval, although the required application documents for is-
suing as provided in the IPSIT seem unchanged. The law imposes more responsibilities on
the issuer, securities professionals, and investors. Article 13 stipulates that the documents
provided by the issuer to the state authority must be true, accurate, and complete. The
professional firms and professionals who produce such documents for the proposed issuing
are under legal duty to ensure the same standards. Any change of issuer's operation or profit
after the issuing is answerable by the issuer and any investment risk caused by such a change
shall be borne by investors themselves."
Article 18 allows the CSRC and other authorities concerned to take actions to correct
their mistakes. For example, an authorization of issuing shall be revoked if the decision is
found to not comply with the laws and regulations; where the issuing is yet made, it shall
be suspended; if the securities have been issued, the holders are entitled to the return of
the issuing price paid plus interest from the issuer.
68. Id. art. 2.
69. See MING PAO, supra note 4.
70. Securities Law art. 7 (1998).
71. See id. art. 10.
72. See id. art. 14.
73. Seeid. art. 15.
74. See id. art. 16.
75. See id. art. 19.
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Public issuing shall be underwritten by securities companies that are selected by the issuer
at its free will in accordance with the law. The underwriting agreements in the form of
either best efforts to sell the securities during the underwriting period as the issuer's agent
or firm commitments to purchase all the securities offered by securities companies for the
purpose of resale to the public are permitted.16 Where the face value of the securities to be
openly issued exceeds RMB 50 million, an underwriter syndicate must be formed." In any
event, underwriters are under a legal duty to examine the issuing documents for their
truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness. Once any false record, misleading statement, or
significant omission is found, the sales may not be conducted; where the sales have started,
they must stop with corrective measures being taken.78
An underwriting period may not exceed ninety days. The underwriters shall file a sales
report with the SCRC within fifteen days of the expiration of the underwriting period.9
Where a stock is issued at a premium, the price may be determined by the issuer, together
with the underwriters; however, the final authorization of the CSRC must be obtained
before the issuing is made.0
C. SECURITIES TRADING
1. Basic Provisions
Securities to be traded must be legally issued ones8' and any trading of listed securities
must be conducted on stock exchanges.82 As a result, the law is silent on the over-the-
counter market. Also, securities may not be traded on the basis of credit, but must be an
on spot transaction, 3 and securities companies are prohibited from providing finance or
lending securities to their clients for trading.Y4
Under the law, some people are prohibited from directly or indirectly owning or trading
any stocks or accepting any stocks from others during their term of office or tenure. They
include staff of securities exchanges, securities companies, securities registration, settlement
institutions, officials of the securities regulatory authorities, and others who may not engage
in trading under the law. Any stocks already owned by these persons prior to the imple-
mentation of the law must be transferred in accordance with the law."s Article 39 further
provides that the institutions that produce auditing reports, asset appraisal reports, or legal
opinions for an issuer shall not purchase or sell the stocks concerned during the under-
writing period and six months thereafter; nor shall they purchase or sell the stocks con-
cerned during the period from the date on which the issuer's appointment for the service
is accepted to the fifth day of the publication of the issuing documents concerned.
Article 41 requires a shareholder to notify the issuer within three days when his holding
reaches five percent of the company's stocks issued; in turn, the company shall file a report
76. See id. arts. 21, 22.
77. See id. art. 25.
78. See id. art. 24.
79. See id. arts. 26, 27.
80. See id. art. 28.
81. See id. art. 30.
82. See id. art. 32.
83. See id. art. 35.
84. See id. art. 36.
85. See id. art. 37.
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within three days to the CSRC and the exchange concerned (if the company is listed). Any
profit of short swing made by a five percent shareholder from trading within six months
shall belong to the company and should be recovered by its board of directors. However,
a securities company which holds five percent or more of the stocks of the issuer under a
firm commitment arrangement is exempted.86
2. Listing Procedures and Standards
Listing of any company must be authorized by the CSRC.8 7 The application documents
specified by Article 45 include a listing application, the relevant resolution of the share-
holders' meeting, the articles of association of the company, its business registration, finan-
cial and accounting reports audited by accredited institutions, legal opinions, recommen-
dation letter of the securities firms, and the latest prospectus.
Under Article 46, the exchange concerned shall make arrangements to list the company
that has received the authorization from the CSRC within six months of receipt of its ap-
plication documents. With the consent of the exchange, the listing documents shall be pub-
lished by the issuer five days before the public trading and placed at the designated place
for public inspection."8 In addition, the issuer is required to publish the trading date approved,
the top ten shareholders and their respective holdings, and the names of directors, super-
visors, managers, and other senior officers of the issuer as well as their holdings.89
Listing of corporate bonds shall be approved by the CSRC90 and the exchange subject to
the procedures. This is similar to stock listing, except that the listing arrangement time is
shortened to three months.9' Moreover, Article 51 sets out the substantive standards for
corporate bond listing to include: (1) the term of the listed bonds being longer than a year;
(2) the actual issued value being no less than RMB 50 million; and (3) the company, while
applying for listing, meets other conditions provided by other laws and regulations. In ad-
dition to bankruptcy, the CSRC may decide to suspend or terminate the listing according
to the seriousness of the conditions if a company is found to have seriously violated the law,
to have had significant change of its conditions so as to render it no longer to meet the listing
standards, to have failed to use the funds raised according to the approved purpose, to have
failed to carry out its legal duties under the issuing conditions, and to have suffered loss for
two consecutive years.92 Article 57 further allows the CSRC to delegate its power to suspend
or terminate listing of company stocks or bonds to the exchanges concerned.
3. Continuous Disclosure
Any listed company shall be under a legal duty of continuous disclosure. Under the law,
a listed company must file with the CSRC and the exchange concerned and publish its mid-
term report within two months of the conclusion of its first half accounting year. It must
also publish its annual reports within four months of the conclusion of its accounting year.
In addition to the common requirements to disclose the financial and operational conditions
and other items provided by the CSRC, a mid-term report has to cover the major litigation
86. See id. art. 42.
87. See id. art. 43.
88. See id. art. 47.
89. See id. art. 48.
90. See id. art. 50.
91. See id. arts. 52, 53, 54.
92. See id. arts. 55, 56.
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in which the company is involved, the change of the stocks or bonds, and important matters
proposed at the shareholders' meeting.93 An annual report needs to include the information
of the directors and other senior officers, the top ten shareholders, and their respective
holdings.9 4
Moreover, according to Article 62, a company must file and publish a special report with
explanation when any major event occurs that may have an impact on the price of its stocks
and is unknown by public investors. The article further articulates the major categories of
these events: (1) significant change of the company's operation policy and business scope;
(2) its important investment or decisions of asset purchase; (3) its conclusion of any impor-
tant contract which may significantly affect the company's assets, liabilities, interests, and
operation result; (4) its incurring of major debts or default of major debts; (5) its significant
deficit or major loss that exceeds ten percent of its net assets; (6) significant change of the
external environment of the company's business operation; (7) change of chairman of its
board of directors, one-third of directors or managers; (8) major change of the holdings of
the shareholders who own five percent or more of the company's stocks; (9) any decisions
of the company on reduction of its capital, merger, division, dissolution, or bankruptcy
application; (10) its involvement in any major litigation or the court's order to annul any
resolution of the shareholders' meeting or the board of directors; and (11) other matters
required by other laws or regulations.
The listed company is responsible for the truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness of its
issuing and listing documents and shall ensure there is no false record, misleading statement,
or significant omission.95 The issuer and the underwriters shall be liable for the loss of the
investors caused by such violations in the company's issuing prospectus, financial and ac-
counting report, listing report, annual report, mid-term report, or special reports. The
responsible directors, supervisors, and managers shall be held jointly liable as well. 96
4. Insider Trading and Fraudulent Conduct
The law prohibits insider trading, market manipulation, making and spreading false in-
formation, and any other fraudulent conduct against investors.97
Article 68 defines the following persons as insiders: the directors, supervisors, managers,
deputy managers, and other senior officers concerned of the issuer; shareholders with five
percent or more holdings; the senior officers of the issuer's holding company; staff who
have access to inside information by virtue of their positions in the company; staff of the
securities regulatory authorities and other staff under legal duty to administer securities
trading; staff of intermediaries, securities registration, and settlement institutions and se-
curities trading service firms that are involved in the company's trading under their legal
duties; and other persons prescribed by the CSRC.
The enumerative approach is also used to define inside information in Article 69. In
addition to the aforementioned information listed in Article 62, which triggers filing of
special reports, Article 69 further adds the following: the company's plan to distribute
dividends or increase capital; the significant change of its share holding structure; the sig-
93. See id. art. 60.
94. See id. art. 61.
95. See id. arts. 59.
96. See id. art. 63.
97. See id. arts. 5, 67, 71, 72, 73.
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nificant change of its debt security; the major mortgage or sales of the company's major
operational assets or scrapping of its assets exceeding thirty percent of the total at one time;
potential major liability to be borne by the senior officers of the company under the law;
any take-over plan of the company; and other information that the CSRC believes to have
notable impact on the trading price of the securities.
Under the law, insiders and other persons who have unlawfully obtained inside infor-
mation are prohibited from purchasing or selling the securities of the company concerned,
disclosing the information, or suggesting others to trade the securities. However, the ban
may not apply to the acquisition by a shareholder with five percent or more stocks of the
company.98
Article 71 sets out the forbidden means of unlawful manipulation of the market: manip-
dating the securities trading price individually or conspiratorially by taking advantage of
the superiority of capital, holdings or information, or by consecutive trading; affecting
trading price or volume by trading at the prearranged time, price or means between the
conspirators or by trading the securities that are not owned by them between them; affecting
trading price or volume through self-dealing and trading without change of ownership; and
other manipulative means.
Under Article 72, government functionaries, employees of mass media, and other persons
concerned are forbidden from making or disseminating false information that will seriously
affect securities trading. Moreover, exchanges, securities firms, securities settlement insti-
tutions, securities service firms, social intermediates, secu'rities business associations, secu-
rities regulatory authorities, and their staff are banned from making any false statement or
misleading investors in securities trading activities. Securities trading information dissem-
inated by mass media is also required to be true, objective, and not misleading.
Fraudulent activities of securities firms and their staff that are prohibited by Article 73
include trading securities against the client's trust, failure to provide affirmative documents
of trading within the stipulated time, misappropriation of clients' entrusted securities or
funds, trading clients' securities, or using clients' name to trade securities without permis-
sion, inducing clients to conduct unnecessary trading for the purpose of commission earn-
ing, and other conduct that violates clients' true will and interests.
In addition, some rules are stipulated to prevent state funds from being risked in securities
speculation. For example, legal persons are prohibited from trading through private accounts;99
no person shall use public funds to conduct securities trading;t°° and SOEs and holding com-
panies of state assets are banned to speculate listed securities. 10 Article 77 further requires the
exchanges, securities companies, securities registration, trading service, and intermediary in-
stitutions and their employees to report to the CSRC any violation they notice.
D. ACQUISITION OF LISTED COMPANY
Article 78 sets out two ways of acquisition: acquisition by tender offer and acquisition by
agreement. An investor shall file a written report with the CSRC and the exchange and
publish it within three days when his holding amounts to five percent of a listed company
98. See id. art. 70.
99. See id. art. 74.
100. See id. art. 75.
101. See id. art. 76.
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as the result of his trading. During this period, he may not continue his trading of the
securities concerned. Afterwards, such an investor is required to make a filing and publi-
cation for his holding fluctuation of every five percent. During the reporting period, and
within two days of the publication, the investor's trading of the securities must
pause.102
Once the investor's holding reaches thirty percent of the issued stocks of the listed com-
pany, if he intends to carry on the acquisition, a tender offer shall be made to all shareholders
in accordance with the law. However, the CSRC may exempt such requirement for tender
offer,103 which would be surely needed to release the state from the mandatory purchase
due to its heavy holdings of most listed companies.
Before any tender offer is made, the acquirer must submit its acquisition report to the
CSRC and the exchange with detailed information of purpose, quantity, terms, and funds
involved in the acquisition.104 The tender offer shall be published fifteen days after the
submission in the acquisition report. The length of the period of a tender offer shall not
be less than thirty days, nor longer than sixty days.105 At the end of the period, trading of
the target company's stocks will be terminated if the acquirer's holding amounts to more
than seventy-five percent of the company's total issued shares. °6 A ninety percent holding
of the acquirer during the period further entitles remaining shareholders to a mandatory
purchase by the acquirer on the terms of the tender offer.107
Under Article 89, the acquirer and the shareholders may, by agreement, transfer the
shares in accordance with the law and regulations concerned. Upon the agreement being
reached, the acquirer must report the agreement in writing to the CSRC and the exchange
within three days and publish it at the same time. Performance of the agreement shall not
be carried out until the publication is made.l °O
In either mode of acquisition, the acquirer may not transfer the shares purchased within
six months of the completion of the acquisition,'0 9 and any purchase of state shares must
be approved by the state authority concerned.10 Article 93 further requires the acquirer to
report to the CSRC and the exchange the result of the acquisition within fifteen days of its
completion and publish it.
E. SECURITIEs EXCHANGES
Article 95 defines an exchange as a non-profitable legal person who provides the cen-
tralized venue for collective securities trading by bidding. Any establishment or dissolution
of an exchange must be approved by the State Council and the adoption and revision of
articles of any exchange must be approved by the CSRC."' According to Articles 99 and
100, a council and the general manager who is appointed by the CSRC shall head an
102. See id. art. 79.
103. See id. art. 81.
104. See id. art. 82.
105. See id. art. 83.
106. See id. art. 86.
107. See id. art. 87.
108. See id. art. 89.
109. See id. art. 91.
110. See id. art. 94.
111. See id. art. 96.
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exchange. Articles 101 and 102 further disqualify certain persons to be in charge of the
exchange and to be employed by the exchange.
It is the legal duty of the exchange to safeguard fair trading by bidding and promptly
publishing the trading conditions."' The exchange is empowered to handle suspension,
resumption, or termination of listing of any stocks and debentures in accordance with the
law"' and may suspend trading in case of certain sudden incidents orforce majeure situa-
tions." 4 It shall also monitor trading in the exchange, report to the CSRC any abnormal
trading, and supervise information disclosure of the listed companies."'
An exchange is empowered by Article 113 to formulate its concrete trading rules, mem-
bership provisions, and working procedures for its staff, subject to the approval of the
CSRC. Persons in charge of exchange operation and other employees shall withdraw if
there proves a conflict of interest involving themselves or their relatives in the course of
executing their duties. 116 The exchange may discipline its staff for violation of trading rules
with such means as disqualification." 7
F. SECURITIES COMPANIES
Any establishment of a securities company, which may be in the form of either a limited
liability company or a joint stock company, must be examined and approved by the CSRC." 8
Such approval is also needed for its branch setting-up or dissolution, or change of its busi-
ness scope or registered capital, amendment to its articles, its merger or division, change
of its business form or dissolution." 9 Under Article 119, securities companies are divided
into two categories: a multiple-function securities company (MFSC) or a securities bro-
kering company (SBC), with different business licenses.
The conditions to establish a MFSC include a minimum registered capital of RMB 500
million, a qualified principal management and business staff, a fixed business place and
infrastructure that meets the standards, a sound management system, and a standardized
setup that separates its own securities operation and its brokering business. 20 On the other
hand, the minimum registered capital of an SBC is RMB 50 million, with other conditions
of staff qualification and infrastructure being similar to an MFSC. 12' Where the registered
capital of a securities company falls below the legal requirement, the CSRC may revoke
the approval of its business operation.' 2
An MFSC is entitled to operate a securities brokering business, its own securities opera-
tion, securities underwriting, and other securities businesses approved by the CSRC.'2' On
the other hand, an SBC may only engage in the securities brokering business.2 4 Securities
112. See id. art. 107.
113. See id. art. 108.
114. See id. art. 109.
115. See id. art. 110.
116. Seeid. art. 114.
117. See id. art. 116.
118. See id. arts. 117, 118.
119. See id. art. 123.
120. See id. art. 121.
121. See id. art. 122.
122. See id. art. 136.
123. See id. art. 129.
124. See id. art. 130.
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companies are prohibited by Article 131 from engaging in any business beyond their ap-
proved scope.
Although Article 135 provides that each securities company shall enjoy its autonomy of
business operation and its lawful business shall be free from any intervention, the law also
articulates many business restrictions. Article 124, for example, stipulates that the CSRC
shall adopt regulations governing the ratio between the total debts of a securities company
and its net assets and the ratio between its total liquid debts and its total circulating assets.
Article 132 states that clients' funds of settlement must be deposited in full in a designated
commercial bank into each individual's account. A securities company is forbidden from
appropriating such funds. Article 133 further stipulates that an MFSC's own securities
business must use its own capital or funds raised in accordance with the law. Funds from
banks are prohibited from flowing into the securities market in violation of the law. Also,
an MFSC must use its own name in conducting its own securities business, and its own
securities account may not be lent out. 2' Article 106 provides that securities purchased by
a securities company, regardless if for its clients' trust or for its own business operation,
shall not be sold out on the same day.
According to Article 138, in conducting brokering business, a securities company has to
open and manage a securities account and a capital account for each client separately, free
of false record. A client account must be opened with a lawful document proving one's
Chinese nationality or Chinese legal person status. Any order placed by a client, regardless
of being executed or not, must be carefully recorded, examined, and kept.2 6 Article 141,
again, repeats the rules of Articles 35 and 36: a securities company may only accept the
sales order backed with the real securities on the client's account and purchase order backed
with the real fund on the client's capital account. In other words, it shall provide neither
financing nor securities lending for clients' trading.
Article 142 forbids a securities company from accepting full powers of attorney, which
would allow the company to decide selling and buying, kinds of securities, quantity, and
price. Articles 143 and 144 prohibit a securities company from promising a client compen-
sation in case of loss or for guaranteed profit, and from taking any client's order outside
the lawfully established exchange. In conjunction with Article 57 of the Company Law,'27
Articles 125 disqualifies certain persons from being directors, supervisors, and managers of
a securities company for being dismissed within five years from any securities exchange,
securities registration settlement institution, or securities company as senior officers due to
their violation of the law, or for being disqualified as professionals due to their violation in
the last five years. Article 126 states that anyone who is dismissed from a securities related
entity or a government office due to his violation may not be employed as staff by any
securities company. Article 127 prohibits any government official, and any others who are
prohibited by the laws or regulations, from being employed on a part-time basis with any
securities company. Senior officers and business staff of a securities company may not take
125. See id. art. 134.
126. See id. arts. 139, 140.
127. A person is disqualified from being a senior officer of any company under Article 57 of the Company
Law if he has no or limited civil capacity; has been convicted for certain crimes; has been responsible as a senior
officer for bankruptcy of any enterprise in recent three years; has been a legal representative of a firm whose
business license has been revoked for its violation in recent three years; or fails to repay personal debts due of
a relatively large amount. Company Law of the P.R.C. art. 57 (1993).
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any position in any other securities company. A securities company shall be held fully liable
if its staff violates trading rules under the company's instruction or by virtue of his posi-
tion.128
G. SECURITIES REGISTRATION AND SETTLEMENT INSTITUTIONS (SRSI)
An SRSI is defined under Article 146 as a non-profit legal person that provides services
of centralized registration, trust, and clearing for securities trading. Any establishment and
dissolution of an SRSI as well as adoption of its articles and business conditions must be
approved by the CSRC.'2 9 Such an institution, in addition to meeting the requirements for
its infrastructure and personnel qualification, must have its own capital of no less than RMB
200 million.3 0
Article 148 specifies the business scope of an SRSI to include opening of securities and
settlement accounts; securities trust and ownership transfer; registration of securities hold-
ers' list; settlement and entrustment of trading of listed securities in the exchange; distri-
bution of securities gains under the trust of the issuer; handling information inquiry con-
cerning the business above mentioned; and other business authorized by the CSRC. All
listed securities to be traded must first be entrusted with an SRSI by the owner.'
For the sake of safe operation, an SRSI is required to establish and improve its necessary
service facilities, data protection measures, and risk management system.' 32 Any original
registration, trust, and settlement documents must be duly kept; important ones shall be
preserved for no less than twenty years.33 Further, an SRSI must establish a settlement risk
fund for the purpose of compensating any losses caused by technical breakdown, operational
mistake, and force majeure situations. 3 4
H. SECURITIES TRADING SERVICE INSTITuTIoNS (STSI)
Under Article 157, professional investment consulting firms and credit appraisal firms
may be established according to the needs of investment and trading business by following
the terms and approval procedures provided by the CSRC.
Business staff of an STSI must have both special knowledge and business experience of
two or more years. " Article 159 prohibits them from representing clients in conducting
securities investment, sharing profit or losses of the securities investment, trading stocks of
the company that the firm services, and other forbidden activities under the law. Article
161 states that an STSI and its staff that produce auditing reports, asset appraisal reports,
or legal opinions must produce such documents in compliance with professional procedures,
and examine and verify their truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness. An STSI and its staff
shall be held jointly liable for their failure to meet legal standards. 136
128. Securities Law of the P.R.C. art. 145 (1998), available at <http://www.chinaonline.com/csubs/1egal/
pdE/securitylaw.pdf>.
129. See id. arts. 146, 149, 156.
130. See id. art. 147.
131. See id. art. 150.
132. See id. art. 152.
133. See id. art. 153.
134. See id. art. 154.
135. See id. art. 158.
136. See id. art. 161.
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I. SECURITIES TRADE ASSOCIATION
A securities trade association is stipulated by Article 162 as a social legal person of self-
discipline organization of securities business. All securities companies are required to join
the association and the member assembly shall be its power organ. The articles of associ-
ation have to be filed with the CSRC for record.' 37
The functions of a securities trade association, under Article 164, include: assisting the
CSRC to educate and organize members to abide by the laws and regulations; upholding
the lawful interests of its members in accordance with law and convey members' suggestions
and concerns to the CSRC; providing its members with information service; formulating
rules of members and organize training and experience exchanges for members; mitigating
disputes between members or between its members and their clients; organizing its mem-
bers to study the issues concerning the development of the business and its operation;
supervising and inspecting its members' conduct and discipline violators; and carrying out
other functions authorized by the CSRC.
J. THE SECURITIES REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
Since the two-tier regulatory structure has been merged into a single organ under the
State Council, the CSRC becomes the exclusive state authority in charge of the securities
market regulation and administration. Article 167 empowers the CSRC to adopt market
regulations and exercise its examination, authorization, and approval power; to supervise
and regulate issuing, trading, registration, trust, and settlement of securities; to supervise
and regulate the business activities of issuers, listed companies, exchanges, securities com-
panies, SRSIs, and STSIs; to formulate and implement qualification and professional stan-
dards of securities business; to supervise and inspect information disclosure of securities
issuing and trading; to supervise and direct the activities of securities associations; to in-
vestigate and penalize any violation of securities laws and regulations; and to carry out other
legal functions.
To that end, the CSRC is provided with extensive powers to take actions, including: to
collect evidence by entering the scene of the violation; to make inquiry to entities and
individuals concerned with the incident under the investigation; to inspect and duplicate
any record of securities trading and transfer registration, financial, and accounting materials
and other documents concerned, and to seal them up where they might be removed or
hidden. CSRC may also examine the capital accounts and securities accounts of the entities
and individuals concerned, and apply with the people's court to freeze them when funds or
securities are likely to be illegally transferred or hidden. "8
To further strengthen the CSRC, Article 171 states that in the course of the CSRC's
enforcement, the entities and individuals under investigation must be cooperative, hand out
the documents and materials faithfully, and may not refuse, hinder, or conceal. Where any
activity under investigation is likely to constitute a crime, the CSRC shall transfer the case
to judiciary branches. 139
Indeed, certain provisions are set out to prevent abuse of power by the CSRC. Article
169, for example, requires CSRC's staff to show the authorization papers while exercising
137. See id. art. 163.
138. See id. art. 168.
139. See id. art. 173.
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their enforcement power and to keep the commercial secrets learned therein confidential.
Article 170 provides that staff of the CSRC must be faithful to their responsibilities; act in
accordance with law; be just and honest; and not seek any illegitimate interest by taking
advantage of their positions. Under Article 172, regulations and working procedures
adopted by the CSRC shall be promulgated and its investigation results and discipline
decisions shall be published. The CSRC's staff may not take any position in institutions or
firms under the CSRC's regulation.14
II. Legal Liabilities
This chapter is the second largest in the Securities Law and includes thirty-six articles
(Chapter 3 on Securities Trading is the largest with forty-eight articles). These articles
cover every violation of the rules of the law. In terms of the nature of the penalties specified,
they may be grouped into three categories.
Criminal liabilities are provided in eighteen of thirty-three articles in the chapter carrying
substantive penalties. Issuing securities without approval, serious violations of disclosure
obligation, establishment of a securities company without permission, insider trading, ma-
nipulation of market and illegal operation of a securities company, SRSI, or STSI may all
trigger imposition of criminal punishment, which further refers to provisions of the Crim-
inal Law.
Administrative sanctions in the form of warning, order to correct, mandatory disposition,
fine, confiscation, outlawing, disqualification, business suspension, revocation of business
license, order to close down, and other administrative disciplines are employed in all sub-
stantive provisions of the chapter. Most penalties of this nature may be imposed against all
corporate, institutional, or individual violators.
As compared with criminal and administrative punishment, the application of civil liabilities
appears in merely two articles. Article 192 provides that a securities company shall be liable
for its violation of the client's trust and true will. Article 202 stipulates that losses resulting
from false content of documents produced by professional firms shall be compensated. Article
210 allows the party concerned to petition the CSRC for reconsideration or to bring a legal
action in the court against a CSRC decision to impose sanctions.
IV. Positive Implications of the Law
Obviously, a full assessment of the legislation cannot be made before the law is tested in
practice. However, this freshness may not prevent a preliminary evaluation based on the
reading of the text and the comparison between the existing regulations and practice and
future trends. Although the securities market development and regulation schemes are still
a distance away from the commonly accepted international standards, certain progress to-
wards closing the gap should be noted.
First of all, the adoption itself deserves a celebration, not only for the achievement of six
years of hard work, but, more importantly, for the latest evidence of China's firm commit-
ment to a stable and orderly development of a market economy. Seven years ago, while
commenting on the future of the Chinese securities market, the paramount leader, then
140. See id. art. 174.
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Deng Xiaoping, cautiously supported its development by stating that "a firm try should be
given to see whether securities and stock market may be used by a socialist regime. If in a
year or two the result is right, we may open the market; if it proves wrong, we may just
close it.'' 4I After vigorous practice for eight years, the official tone has become much more
upbeat. PresidentJiang Zemin recently stated that "practice of the socialist market economy
inevitably warrants the existence of securities market.1' 42 There is no doubt that the secu-
rities markets in China will continue to play a very active and crucial role in the SOE
reform and the financial system reform for years to come. As such, the legislation clearly
reflects China's deepened understanding of the philosophy and practice of a market econ-
omy, particularly securities markets.
14
1
Further development of the Chinese securities market will have a significant impact on
privatization of the national economy on a gradual basis.144 For example, the law no longer
requires public issuing as a precondition of listing as stipulated in the Company Law, 145 and
the IRSIT,14 6 which has been subject to certain quantity requirements and scrutiny based
on the state industrial policy for government approval. According to the national legislature,
such a deletion is intended to enable private enterprises to have access to the capital market
through public listings. 47 As such, at least theoretically, the securities market privatization
may take place through either increase of private holdings of state-owned companies 14 or
direct competition of private economy with state companies on equal footing for the market
access. Although in China today privatization is still holding its political sensitivity, 49 the
recent amendment to the Constitution legally recognizing private economy as "an impor-
tant part of socialist economy" has indicated that the trend seems inevitable.5 0
The comprehensive enactment marks a new stage of market development based on a
uniform national law. After the promulgation, Mr. Zhou Zhenqing, the current Chairman
of the CSRC, has stated that, in conjunction with the implementation of the Securities Law,
the year of 1999 would be devoted to an overhaul of all existing regulations and a national
campaign of Securities Law awareness.' 5' Thus, people may hope that the implementation
141. DENG XIAOPING, DENG XIANPING WENXUN [SELECTED DENG XIAOPING'S WORKS] 486B487 (1996).
142. ZHENGQUAN ZHISI DUREN [READING MATERIALS ON SECURITIES] 1 (Zhou Zhengqing ed., 1998).
143. See generally Geoffrey Nicoll, Philosophy, Law and Practice in the Markets for Chinese Securities, 9 AUSTL.
J. CORP. L. 327 (1998) (discussing the issue).
144. Professor Intriligator points out that one important reason for China reform's success and Russia's
failure is that China postpones or prevents political reform and retaining an authoritarian political system to
avoid political risk. By contrast, the former Soviet Union (1985) and Russia (1992-) tried to accomplish political
and economic reform simultaneously. Michael D. Intriligator, Comment and Report (Jan. 20, 1998), in WHAT
RUSSIA COULD LEARN FROM CHINA IN THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY (The University of Hong Kong
1998).
145. Company Law of the P.R.C. article 152 (1) (1993).
146. IRSIT, art. 30 (1) (1993).
147. See Securities Law Opens Door to Private Enterprises to Go Public, CHINA ECON. NEWS, Nov. 30, 1998, at 4.
148. See MING PAo (Hong Kong), June 16, 1999, at A19 (explaining that since 1997, firms from non-public
sectors have gained controlled over 23 listed companies that transformed from SOEs through secondary market
acquisition).
149. See China's Coming Recession, THE ECONOMIST, May 2, 1998, at 11 (showing that privatization is still
considered a dirty word in China today).
150. See XIANFA, P.R.C. CONST. art. 11 (amended Mar. 15, 1999) (upgrading the status of private economy
from "supplement to the socialist economy under public ownership" to "an important part of the socialist
market economy").
151. The CSRC Chairman Zhou Zhenqingo n the Securities Law, XINHuA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 30,1 998, available
in <http://www.chinainfobank.com> [hereinafter CSRC Chairman].
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of the law would help to reduce and eventually eliminate the conflicts and inconsistency
among regulations issued by different state authorities and local governments.
The centralized regulatory framework with a single regulatory body is codified. As a result,
the powers shared by fourteen state organs as well as local governments now exclusively belong
to the CSRC. Such a restructure represents significant progress in the Chinese securities
market because it promotes regulatory efficiency. It also puts the different government inter-
ests under control, closes loopholes for corrupt practice, and lays a foundation of profession-
alism in market development. Moreover, a unified regulatory regime has been urgently needed
in China as an effective means to prevent financial risk, particularly after the bursting-out of
the Asian financial turmoil. Thus, the codification is a very timely move."'
Before the SCSC and the CSRC merged into a single regulatory body, a constitutional
challenge to the CSRC's enforcement authority has long existed.' Under Article 90 of the
Constitution of PRC, only ministries and commissions directly under the State Council
may promulgate regulations and decrees and, thus, other government units may not exercise
such state administrative functions and power. However, the SCSC was only a coordinating
authority composed of fourteen state organs in charge of macro-administration and policy
making, whereas all of the routine regulatory and enforcement powers thus have been
carried out by the CSRC as its lower branch. As such, the unification and centralization of
the regulatory organs directly under the State Council solved the problem. Apparently, as
far as the enforcement is concerned, the function of the CSRC is modeled on the Securities
Exchange Commission of the United States, with similarly broad powers. 5 4 Moreover, the
regulatory model affirmed by the Securities Law is also very similar to the one in the United
States with combined state regulation and professional self-discipline.'
In addition to provisions that are restated in the Securities Law from the existing gov-
ernment regulations, a new striking focus is to prevent financial turmoil and a bubble
economy on the securities market. As a top legislative officer of the Standing Committee
pointed out, while the law tried to adapt itself to the trend of globalization and bring itself
in line with international practice, it has paid more attention to protecting China's financial
safety.116 To this end, several walls are either preserved or built up. First, the status quo in
separation of A and B shares is maintained. According to a top leader of the NPC, given
the infant and weak conditions of the Chinese securities market, the A shares market is not
ready for opening up to foreign investors.' He further believes that the isolation of the A
152. See China's Coming Recession, supra note 149, at 11. Also Professor Tomasic believes that, to a large
extent, the passage of the Securities Law is made possible by fears of domestic market collapse which have been
fueled by the collapse of markets in other parts of Asia. Tomasic, supra note 66, at 284.
153. XIANDAI ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN FA [MODERN SECURITIES LAW OF PRCI 116-17 (Chen Dagang ed.,
(1994).
154. For a brief review of SEC wide regulatory function and enforcement powers, see MARc I. STEINBERG,
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 325-46 (1996).
155. It is perceived in China that three main regulatory models exist in the world: balanced regulatory
system with both government regulation and professional self-discipline adopted in major European countries;
single professional self-disciplinary system as the one in United Kingdom; and the regulatory model led by the
government with extensive enforcement powers in the United States. ZHENGQUAN FA LUN [A STUDY OF SE-
CURITIES LAw] 211-19 (Wu Hong ed., 1998). It has been argued that China should adopt the third model,
although currently the professional self-discipline is too weak to meaningfully function. See ZhengYue, Wuoguo
Zhengquan Lifa Ying Zhuyi "Sange Tongyi" [The Securities Legislation of Our Country Should Focus on Unification],
11 JINOJI Yu FA [ECONOMICS AND LAW] 12, 13 (1997).
156. Li Fei, China Promulgates First Securities Law, 18 CHINA LAW, 58, 59 (Mar. 1999).
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share market and the inconvertibility of Renminbi should be credited for the fact that China
has not been seriously affected by the Asian financial turmoil. 5 ' Second, other financial
businesses, including banking, trust, and insurance, are blocked away from the securities
market. For instance, Article 133 forbids bank funds to flow into the securities market in
violation of the law. Third, both securities companies and public investors must use only
their own capital or funds raised in a legitimate way for their securities operation. Fourth,
public funds and SOEs are prohibited from being involved in securities speculation. Fifth,
the law demands that all trading be conducted as on spot transactions. All of these restric-
tions clearly reflect the government's deep concerns with the current market conditions in
China and recent financial crises in other countries.
Under the Securities Law, investors' protection is also improved with tightened admin-
istrative restrictions and penalties. The domination of the government branches in issuing
approval, for instance, has been weakened by introduction of the professionals' role in
examination. Thus, the market risk associated with government intervention would be re-
duced and issuers' quality decided more by the market interest. The law also tries to curtail
risky market speculation by prohibiting securities companies from assisting trading with
finance or stock lending. Article 192 of the law further subjects a securities company to a
fine of up to RMB 100,000 and civil liability for trading in violation of its client's true will.
In order to prevent the issuer and controlling shareholder from misappropriating investors'
money, Article 20 stipulates that funds raised from listing must be used in accordance with
the purpose stated in the issuing prospectus. Any change must be approved by the share-
holders' meeting, and violation of this rule shall lead to a ban of any subsequent issuing.
Moreover, the requirement of the IRSIT for any issuer to print on the cover of its pro-
spectus a statement that the decision made by the government regulatory body on the
issuing shall not be deemed as its substantive judgment or guarantee for the value of the
stock and its return now is replaced with the direct provision of the law. Article 19 reminds
investors that they shall be the ultimate bearers of the investment risk.
With truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness being established as the governing stan-
dards for all issuing continuing disclosure documents, information disclosure should be
improved. Under the IRSIT, an issuer is required to make a statement on the cover of its
prospectus to guarantee the truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness of the documents and
professional firms and underwriters shall examine the documents under these standards. 159
The Securities Law not only turns the issuer's personal guarantee to investors into a clear
statutory duty, but also extends the standards to all kinds of documents concerning issuing,
listing, and continuing disclosure. Moreover, an important exception to disclosure of special
events under the IRSIT, which allows a listed company to keep certain events in the dark,
subject to exchange approval, if it has any good reason to believe the disclosure would
damage its interests, 60 has been deleted by the law. At the same time the liability imposed
157. This position has been reiterated by Primier Zhu Rongji in relation to China's participation into WTO.
See WAL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1999.
158. See The Key Issues Raised in the Review of the Draft Securities Law by the Standing Committee of the NPC,
XINHUA News AGENCY, Nov. 6, 1998, available in <http://www.chinainfobank.com> [hereinafter Key Issues
Raised].
159. See IRSIT arts. 16, 18, 21. In Chapter 6, entitled Information Disclosure of Listed Companies of the
IRSIT, the standards are not mentioned at all.
160. See id. art. 60.
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against disclosure violation is increased. For instance, the penalties for an issuer's disclosure
violation include a fine of up to RMB 600,000 and RMB 300,000 against the issuer and any
responsible person, respectively, or even criminal liability."' With regard to institutional
liability of professional firms for producing false documents, a fine up to five times their
unlawful income may be imposed. However, a separate fine against responsible individual
professionals does not appear in the law.62
The law streamlines some important issuing and trading practices. Article 25 sets out
issuing face value of RMB 50 million as the floor of syndicate underwriting to replace a
confusing rule of the IRSIT.163 Under Article 26 of the law, the underwriting period is only
capped at ninety days without mentioning a minimum period. As compared with Article
24 of the IRSIT, which prohibits the period from being shorter than ten days, the law seems
to allow more flexibility of the parties concerned in a reasonable way.
Also, notable changes are made to the stock issuing, listing, and acquisition rules. As far
as stocks issuing and listing are concerned, government approval based on substantive scru-
tiny has been replaced with the CSRC's authorization right before the adoption, although
the concept is not defined in the law at all. This last minute change is primarily made on
two grounds. First, many members of the national legislature believed that an authorization
scheme should be introduced as a means to reduce the government's involvement and
improve the transparency of the issuing and listing process. 64 Second, the unbalanced
CSRC's powers and liability as provided in the last draft were seriously challenged in the
Standing Committee. Many members pointed out that unlike the registration system in the
United States and many other jurisdictions, the CSRC had been conducting substantive
examination of all issuing and listing applications. But it has not been subject to any liability
for its error in examination. Thus, they held that the fundamental principle of fairness was
violated.161 This is the background against which the CSRC's approval is changed. It surely
represents a positive trend of more market freedom and less government control, although
the real effect of the change may have to be tested in practice.
According to Chapter 4 of the IRSIT, after five percent shareholding is acquired, report
and publication must be made for every two percent change of the acquirer's holding.
Thirty percent holding, as the threshold, will trigger the tender offer at a stipulated priceM
161. According to art. 181 of the Criminal Law, five-year imprisonment may be imposed against making
and disseminating of false information. The IRSIT, however, specifies neither criminal nor administrative
sanctions. See IRSIT arts. 74, 78.
162. Under art. 73 of the IRSIT, any individual violator in professional firms may be fined for up to RMB
300,000.
163. Id. art. 22, which states that syndicate underwriting is required where either the face value of the
proposed issuing exceeds RMB 30 million or projected sale proceeds exceed RMB 50 million.
164. See Gupi.o FAxING SHANGSHI JIANG Yu SHENPIZHI GAIWEI HEZUENZHI, The Approval Regime of Stock
Issuing and Liting To Be Changed To Authorization, FAZHI RIRAO [Legal Daily], Dec. 24, 1998, at 2.
165. Art. 16 of the last draft provided that CSRC's approval of any securities issuing shall not represent any
substantive judgment of or guarantee for the securities issued and its return. In discussion, some members of
the Standing Committee of the NPC accused the CSRC that participated in the drafting of self-protection
and unfair discharge of liabilities. See the opinions of Mr. Chi Haibin and Mr. Cai Renshan, reported in the
Research Office under the General Office of the Standing of the NPC;Jujie Quanguo Renda ChangweihuiDiwuci
Huiyi Shenyi Zhengquanfa Caoan Jiaodian Zongshu [A Review of the Focused Issues in Examination of the Draft
Securities Law], 91 ZHENCQUAN SHIcHANG ZHUOKAN [SEcuRITIEs MARKET WEEKLY] 4, 5 (Nov. 14, 1998) [here-
inafter A Review].
166. Under art. 34 of the IRSIT, the price of a tender offer shall be the higher one between the highest
price paid by the tender offeror in its acquisition of the stocks in the 12 months before the tender offer is made
and the average market price of the stock in 30 working days before the tender offer is made.
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within a period no shorter than thirty days. The acquisition is deemed failed if the shares
purchased do not amount to fifty percent of the issued stocks by the end of the period,
which will ban the offeror from purchasing more than five percent of the stock in any
following year unless a new tender offer is made. During the tender offer period, the offeror
may change the terms of the offer by immediately notifying the offerees through news
conference or news media publication.
The new law brings the acquisition rules closer in line with normal market operation by
deleting the mandatory price of the tender offer and restriction on the unsuccessful acqui-
sition. Moreover, the report and publication interval is stretched to five percent, a cap of
sixty days is placed on the tender offer period, and change of tender offer terms may not
be permitted unless being approved by the CSRC. More importantly, acquisition by agree-
ment is legalized as an alternative means, which is designed to improve liquidity of state
and legal person shares between different state-owned entities in an environment where
trading of these shares on an open market is not permitted. 167 According to Professor Li
Yining, such changes are effected mainly on the ground of market efficiency. The two
percent interval, for example, was originally borrowed from the legislation of the United
States.161 However, under the five percent rule, an acquirer with five percent holdings must
file reports and publication thirteen times before reaching the thirty percent threshold, not
mentioning the repeated pausing of trading during the reporting period. As a result, the
high cost of acquisition on the securities market may prevent optimum allocation of re-
sources from taking place. Thus, the legislature decided to relax the requirement. 69
The provisions against insider trading further illustrate Chinese characteristics of the law.
Unlike the IRSIT and the rules of other countries, the wide statutory definition of insiders
includes not only traditional corporate insiders and others concerned, such as enforcement
officers, tax officers, and journalists, but even five percent shareholders. As far as inside
information is concerned, the approach of combining a statutory definition and a list of all
kinds of inside information is also striking. The categories of inside information as listed
in Articles 62 (2) and Article 69 are as many as eighteen, including the catch-all allowing
the CSRC to add more as it considers fit. Many believe that such a scheme with heavy
criminal liability is needed to address such an extensive and serious violation. 17 °
To further improve securities market regulation, the law places its emphasis on due pro-
cedure. Although the detailed procedures need to be further specified, it seems established
that they must be lawful, open, and subject to inspection. For example, the principles are
applicable to authorization and approval of securities issuing, listing, and imposition of
penalties against violations. However, in most places, the time frame is not provided, except
that the examination period for issuing is prolonged from sixty days in the draft of Septem-
ber 1998 to three months under the law.
Corporate bonds have been considered the least developed part of the Chinese capital
market.' In neither the Company Law, nor the Regulation of Corporate Bond Adminis-
167. See LIANZHOU supra note 6, at 167.
168. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1988).
169. See Agreement Has Been Reached on How to Borrow the International Standards, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S
DAILY], Nov. 23, 1998.
170. See id.
171. WORLD BANK, supra note 44, at 35. As compared with listing of A share companies at the current speed
of two companies per week, by the end of 1996 there were only six companies to have their bonds listed
altogether in the two exchanges. See the statistics provided in 97 ZHONOGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZHANWANG
[97 PERSPECTIVE OF THE CHINESE SECURITIES MARKET], 182, 188 (Wu Xiaoqiu ed., 1997).
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tration of 1993, is listing of such securities even mentioned. Apparently, the Securities Law
tries to improve the situation by setting out the urgently needed issuing and listing rules.
For example, under Article 53, the time for an exchange to list corporate bonds is three
months, much shorter than six months for stock listing. As such, the law indeed paves a
new way of corporate finance.
V. Unsettled Issues
Despite the notable progress mentioned above, the breakthrough seems limited and falls
short of many expectations, since quite a few fundamental concerns are left either in prob-
lematic status quo, or addressed with unsatisfactory solutions.'
First, the legislature itself did not intend to enact a securities law to be used for a long
time by solving all the demanding problems in the first place. According to Professor Li
Yining, at least eight important issues are intentionally avoided: the restriction on the trans-
fer of state and legal person shares, the transfer of unlisted stocks, certain irregular internal
issuing of securities to employees, right issuing, the separation of A and B share markets,
the unequal prices among A, B, and foreign listed shares of the same company, listing of
China funded companies in Hong Kong, 73 and the appointment of the general managers
of exchanges by the government. 7 4 Despite arguments for fair and equal treatment, the law
still outlaws the participation of SOEs in the securities market and provides that B share
issuing and trading shall still be governed by another set of regulations of the State
Council."' As such, the legislation is congenitally deficient due to the unripe conditions to
unify the markets and continued ideological struggles.
The law is further crippled by not providing securities with any definition. Thus far it
seems clear that futures trading shall be governed by a separate law,176 and the conditions
for securities derivatives trading are not ripe, although the regulatory powers over all these
fields have been granted to the CSRC. Also to the disappointment of many, the Securities
Law fails to inaugurate the opening of the over-the-counter (OTC) market in China. For
example, Mr. Yang Zhihua, a member of the drafting group, held that development of the
OTC market in China was not only necessary, but also feasible. In 1995 he even predicted
172. After the passage of the Securities Law, the market pessimism has forced Mr. Zhuo Zhengqing, the
current Chairman of the CSRC, to fight back by promising to further improve the securities regulatory frame-
work. See CSRC Chairman, supra note 151.
173. The sudden bankruptcy of Guangdong International Trust and Investment Group (GITIc) and billions
of losses by its two Hong Kong listed subsidiaries have really hit home of the corrupt operation of these
mainland-funded companies in Hong Kong. For two recent reports, see Lana Wong, Debt Troubles at Guang-
dong Investment Arm Threaten SAR, SoUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 1999, at China Business Review
Section 1; Matthew Miller, Questions of Felony Emerge in Gitic Crash, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 23,
1999, at B3. For a recent treatment on the issues concerned, see Xianchu Zhang, One Country, Two Separated
Markets and Their Bumping Integration-Legal Issues Concerning Cross-border Listing ofMainand-funded Companies
in Hong Kong, 10 AUSTL.J. CORP. L. 47 (1999).
174. See Key Issues Raised, supra note 158.
175. Securities Law, art. 213. For a comment, see Jackie Lo, New PRC Securities Law Fails To Fully Unify
Regulation of Securities Issues in China, CHINA LAW & PIRACTICE, 21, 24 (Feb. 21, 1999).
176. Although several drafts of the Futures Trading Law have been completed, the adoption of the law
seems not in the immediate agenda of the legislature. In fact, the State Council, by a decree dated August 1,
1998, ordered to close 11 of 14 futures markets then in China and to suspend trading of 23 of 35 commodity
items on the market. At the time, extraterritorial futures trading was strictly banned. The decree subjects the
entire futures market to the regulation and supervision of the CSRC.
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that such a development in China would be an international focus in the near future. 1"
After examining the trend of corporatization and privatization in China, Professor Geoffrey
Nicoll also noted that " ... China's OTC market may well prove to be of even greater
long-term significance in the development of the true character of Chinese corporations
and the markets for their securities."' 78 Despite these high hopes and a wide variety of semi-
official and unofficial markets having been in existence for years, the CSRC has taken a
hostile attitude to the OTC market from the perspective of government control.1' 9
After the passage of the Securities Law, opening the OTC market at one moment seemed
to appear on the CSRC's agenda again when the Shenzhen government declared that the
State Council had approved in principle to establish a NASDAQ-type OTC market in Shen-
zhen after the OTC market in Hong Kong starts its operation in October 1999.18 However,
the CSRC quickly denied the Shenzhen's claim by stating that China had no intention to
establish any OTC market in the near future. 8' This contradiction is particularly interesting
because it took place after the adoption of the Securities Law, which indicates that conflict of
interest and power struggle between the CSRC and local governments may still be going on.
As far as types of securities are concerned, the contents of the law intend to cover only
stocks and corporate bonds at the present time. As such, the issuing and listing of treasury
bonds, financial bonds, and securities of investment funds are left for other regulations.'1 2
Although the applicable scope of the law under Article 2 is drafted in such a way that any
addition may be made when the State Council so wishes, the strategy might not work. Since
most rules are specifically applicable to either stocks or corporate bonds, any addition of
varieties may require a formal time-consuming procedure of legislative amendment, par-
ticularly when different regulatory schemes need to be effected.
The most striking characteristic of the Securities Law, as observed by Professor Jiang
Ping, a leading authority in civil and commercial law in China, is its restrictive and au-
thoritarian, rather than enabling, nature. He points out that all the rules of the law are
compulsory on the parties concerned, leaving little room for their discretion.'1 3 Indeed, in
addition to thirty-three articles with substantive penalties among 214 total provisions, nu-
merous places are occupied with wording of authorization, approval, examination, review,
supervision, prohibition, and forbidding. His view is shared by Professor Roman Tomasic,
who found that almost half of the articles in the draft of the law dealt with the role of the
CSRC. He further pointed out that this emphasized the continuation of the heavy regu-
latory approach in the securities market in China, and contrasted that with the mixed system
177. See YANG ZHIHUA, ZHENGQUAN FALU ZHIDU YANJIU [A STUDY OF SECURITIES LEGAL SYSTEM], 246-47
(1995).
178. Nicoll, supra note 143, at 341.
179. The CSRC ordered local governments to clamp down the local trading markets in 1996. For a treat-
ment, see Holmes, supra note 39, at 751-52. In 1998 alone, 42 OTC markets were closed up by the CSRC
and more are expected to be shut down in 1999. JINXUN SHUJU [ACCURATE DATA], Mar. 16, 1999, available in
<http://www.chinainfobank.com>.
180. See ACCURTE DATA, supra note 179.
181. SeeMING PAO (HONG KONG), Apr. 22, 1999, at B13.
182. It is interesting to note that until late October 1998, the agreement among the drafters was still held
to make the law to govern not only stocks and corporate bonds, but also investment funds and other financial
derivatives. See Liujiawei, Fangwen Cao Fengqi [An Interview with Professor Cao Fengqi as a member oftbe Securities
Law drafting group], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECURITIES], Oct. 24, 1998, at 1.
183. See Jiang Ping, The Securities Law by Its Nature Is a Regulatoty Law; ZHONGGUO ZHENQUAN BAO [CHINA
SECURITIES],Jan. 5, 1999.
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of public and private regulation found in Western stock markets. 184 Thus, to a large extent
the law is still a product blended with the deep caution for a developing market and rigid
political ideology.
The maintenance of government control over the securities market does raise some se-
rious concerns. Unlike the SEC of the United States, which is an independent and non-
partisan organ responsible for investor protection, 85 the main function of the CSRC as a
subordinate government instrument is to implement the government financial policy. Ex-
cessive government involvement and control have already harmed the normal function and
mechanism of the market, such as ownership discrimination in resource distribution, gov-
ernment intervention to market operation, securities price distortion, and decrease of mar-
ket incentive and discipline on public issuing companies. 8 6 Moreover, refusal to withdraw
government domination from the securities market may render the well-designed institu-
tion meaningless. For example, former CSRC Chairman Zhou Daojong stated that al-
though the professional involvement and voting in the securities issuing process was intro-
duced as early as 1995, examination with bent standards and deals between money and
powers have still made their way in listing quota distribution.I"7
It has been observed that the major problem faced by the Chinese securities market does
not originate from its infancy, but from its authoritarian political structure. Mr. Frank
Razzano, a parmer in the firm of Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky in Washington,
D.C., believes that if China is to develop a vibrant securities market, it must end its excessive
control over the market and must force company management to be responsible to its public
shareholders; otherwise the Chinese securities market is destined to fail.' s
Another related concern very strongly expressed by members of the national legislature
is the lack of a check and balance system on government market regulation. Is9 Mr. XuJialu,
one of the Vice Presidents of the Standing Committee of the NPC, held that concentration
of excessive powers on the CSRC without sufficient checking would easily trigger inter-
vention of the government as well as the Communist Party on the market and corruption.-9
Others also pointed out the material unproportionality between the CSRC's excessive pow-
ers and its duties, as well as liabilities- that can only be found in four articles of the law.
Under the Securities Law, although the approval for stock issuing and listing has been
replaced with relaxed authorization, the CSRC's approval is still required for corporate
bond issuing and listing. Thus, the fairness question seems only partially solved. If the
CSRC makes any mistake in reviewing the application materials of bond issuing and listing,
should the authority be free from any liability? Under the law, the CSRC continues to play
184. See Tomasic, supra note 66, at 290.
185. The SEC was created by section 4(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934. For a treatment of its status
and function, see Lous Loss AND LOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 285-96 (3rd ed. 1989).
186. For a recent Comment, see Han Zhiguo, Yao Ruobua Zhengquan Skichang de Xingzbengjizhi [Admin-
istrative Mechanism on Securities Market Sbould Diminish], 4 GAIGE [REFoRM] 6, 7 (1997).
187. SeeA Review, supra note 165, at 7.
188. See Frank C. Razzano, Is China Entering the Free Market?, 26 SEC. REG. L.J. 317, 324-5 (1999).
189. The concern is so deep and evident that among 27 members of the Standing Committee whose opinions
on the regulatory framework are published, 22 including the president and several vice presidents either openly
opposed the rules to vest too much power in the CSRC without sufficient checking mechanism, or strongly
questioned the appropriateness of the provisions. See A Review, supra note 165, at 4-6.
190. Id. at 4. His view was shared by at least six other members who published their opinions, at id. 5-6.
191. See the opinions of Mr. Zhou Daojong, Mr. Zhang Xuedong and Mr. Wu Dexin. Id.
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its contradictory roles as the market administrator, regulator, and enforcement officer at
the same time. As a result, the CSRC has not earned much public trust.192
Second, the extensive power of the CSRC to impose various penalties is questioned for
lack of legal basis. According to Article 2 of the Administrative Litigation Law of PRC,
concrete administrative conduct may be challenged if it infringes on the lawful rights and
interests of a party concerned. Article 11 extends administrative permission into the scope
of judicial review.1 93 However, Article 210 of the Securities Law allows legal action against
the CSRC only for the penalties imposed on the ground of violation. Thus, the CSRC's
denial of any issuing or listing application may not entitle the applying issuer to litigate the
decision. Although Professor Ying Xongnian, a leading authority of administrative law in
China, questioned the provisions concerned, 194 it is still enacted with only minor revision
to the draft.199
Effective compensation to investors through private actions is another disappointing as-
pect of the Securities Law. As mentioned above, only two of thirty-three articles containing
substantive penalties mention civil compensation. Indeed, Article 207 states that when a
violator's assets prove insufficient to satisfy both civil liability and administrative fine, the
civil liability shall be paid first. However, its effectiveness in practice may not be very
meaningful if Article 209 is taken into account. Article 209 stipulates that any unlawful
income and fine collected for a securities violation shall be handed over to the state treasury.
As a result, two problems appear: first, Article 207 allows only priority of civil compensation
over CSRC's fine, but not over its confiscation and thus the priority of confiscation may
wipe out all investors' hopes for justified civil compensation; and second, it is most likely
that unlawful income of a violator comes from the pockets of wronged investors. If so, for
the sake of justice it should first be returned to the victims of the wrongdoing, rather than
to the state.
The recent Minyuan Company case dealt with by the CSRC serves as a good illustration
of the concerns here. Minyuan is a listed company of Hainan Province. In 1997 it was found
guilty of fraud by fabricating profit and increased capital, which drove the price of the
company dramatically up by over ten times in 1996 based on its projected earning of RMB
0.87 per share. However, its real profit turned out to be only RMB 0.05 per share. After
investigation for over a year, the CSRC announced its decision on April 29, 1998. In ad-
dition to some personal liabilities and fines, the unlawful income of the violators of RMB
132.81 million from the investors' pockets was confiscated by the government.196 As a result,
192. See Liao Shiming, Zhongguo Zhengiianbui ji zhong Jiaose yu Yishen [The CSRC Concentrates Many Roles
onto ltself]; XINBAO [HoNG KONG FINANCIAL JOURNAL], Oct. 20, 1998, at 19. The author, by using Hongguang
case as mentioned in the first part of this article as an example, questioned legitimacy of the CSRC in both
approving the listing and ruling on the liability after the fraud was discovered. He held that this regulatory
structure represents the typical Chinese style.
193. According to some leading administrative law scholars, such permission is of nature to enable economic
development of the party concerned. XINGZHENG FAXUE [A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW], 178 (Lou Hoocai,
ed., 1996).
194. A Review, supra note 165, at 5.
195. For example, the draft provided that anyone who refused or hindered the CSRC's examination or
enforcement would be fined up to RMB 200,000. After Professor Ying's question to its legitimacy, the direct
fine was deleted. Id.
196. For the CSRC's decision, see 4 Zhongguo ZhengquanJiancha Weiyuanhui Gongbao [CSRC's Official
Bulletin] 52-53 (1998).
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little was left to 107,000 private investors of the badly managed company after one year's
suspension of trading.
A law professor in China has challenged the lawfulness of the decision for disregarding
protection of private rights.' 9' Moreover, the investors' position for effective and sufficient
compensation seems further weakened by the deletion from the new law of a catch-all
provision in the IRSIT stating that civil liability shall be imposed wherever a violation causes
a loss to others. 191 As a result, beyond ultra vires dealing and false disclosure as the only two
grounds for civil compensation, victims of other wrongdoing may find it difficult to ground
their private actions. Although arguably, certain provisions of the General Principles of
Civil Law of PRC may be applied here, it has been long held that on a particular issue the
provision of the specific applicable law shall prevail over the general rules. Furthermore,
the request to establish a social organization of investors in order to protect their common
interest'" heard no echo from the legislation. Apparently, unlike the regulatory regime of
the United States where private actions are deemed an effective and indispensable supple-
ment to assure compliance of the securities law,2°° the law of PRC considers investors in
this government monopolized industry merely subjects of government protection, not part
of the enforcement framework by their private actions. In this regard, it is interesting to
note that Article 27 of the Interim Provisions on Prohibition of Securities Fraud of 1993
(Provisions against Fraud), which encourages the public to report securities fraud and other
violations with rewards, has been considered as a development of the law against insider
trading and other violations on the awareness of the finite nature of the CSRC's investi-
gative capabilities20l and is not codified in the Securities Law.
Another important omission in the Securities Law is the rule governing transactions
between affiliated companies. Since 1995, several such incidents have attracted a great deal
of social and legal attention. For instance, in 1994 Hengtong Holding Co. became the
largest shareholder of Lingguang Company after it purchased 3 5.5 percent of the stock of
Lingguang as a listed company in Shanghai Exchange for RMB 51.6 million. Very soon,
by taking advantage of its controlling position, Hengtong made Lingguang purchase one
of Hengtong's wholly-owned subsidiaries for RMB 160 million. °0 However, virtually no
rules can be found governing this type of transaction in China. Thus, many crucial legal
issues have been awaiting legislative answers, such as how to define related transactions,
what legal standards should govern disclosure of such transactions, to what extent the mi-
nority shareholders' interest should be protected, and how fair dealing can be assured. As
some practitioners point out, the development of the securities market urgently demands
enactment in this field for streamlining the practice., 3 The law simply sheds no light on
these pressing issues.
197. YIAO XINHUA, Dui ZHENGOUAN QIZHA DE SIQUANJIUJI [PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR SECURITIES FRAUD] 175-
84 (Wang Weiguo and Roman Tomasic eds., 1999).
198. See IRSIT art. 77.
199. See Yiuguan Zbengquanfa de Jige Wenti [Some Issues Concerning the Securities Law]; JINRONG SHIBAO [FI-
NANCIAL TIMES], Dec. 4, 1998, at 8.
200. In this regard, for a discussion, see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK (1994 ed.).
In the United States, the number of private actions is much larger than SEC actions. RICHARD M. PHILLIPS ET
AL., ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, (Chinese translation of their
presentation to the International Forum on Securities and Futures Trading Law held Jan. 9-17,1997 in Beijing),
(Shan Changzhong ed., 1997).
201. See Brian Daly, Of Shares, Securities, and Stakes:. the Chinese Insider Trading Law and the Stakeholder Theory
of Legal Analysis, 6 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 971, 1012 (1996).
202. See Lu AQINC, JIEKE SHANGsHI [LISTING THROUGH SELL PURCHASE], 17 (1998).
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Despite great efforts, the poor draftsmanship of rules against insider trading may prevent
them from functioning well. For instance, Article 69 (Article 34 of the former draft), which
stipulates that inside information is such information as has not been disclosed, fails to
define the term "disclosure (Gongkai)." In comparison, Article 64 defines "publication
(Gonggao)" as follows: to publish the information concerned on the newspapers, journals,
or bulletins designated by the government authority. Hence, as the scope of disclosure is
not clarified in Article 69, disclosure of the information to a small group of people may
circumvent the operation of the law °4 Moreover, the tippees are not clearly included in
the regime. Article 4 (3) of the Provision against Fraud explicitly forbids non-insiders'
trading on inside information. However, Article 70 of the Securities Law only prohibits
insiders and others who unlawfully obtain inside information from trading, or disclosing to
others or suggesting others to trade. As such, without any legal standard to judge the
lawfulness of the acquisition of inside information, tippees' liability seems to be not clearly
provided.
As far as technical aspects of securities market regulation are concerned, some issues are
left wide open. Some securities firms have complained that over-emphasizing investors'
protection ignores their lawful interests and feasible operation. For example, the law bans
funds from SOEs and banks to enter into the securities market; prohibits securities com-
panies from providing any finance or lending any securities to their clients; and forbids
securities companies from raising capital unlawfully and commingling funds from different
accounts. However, the law fails to tell how eighty-eight securities companies nationwide,
with their own capital of less than RMB 20 billion, can keep up with the liquidity and
further expansion of the securities market with the current market value of RMB 2 trillion
in such a regulatory framework.Y°" As a market commentator states, the market will be dead
if some measures cannot be worked out for brokerages soon.206 Thus, some practitioners
have even appealed to postpone the implementation of the Securities Law. 07
203. See Wu Bin, Wuoguo Zhengquan Lifa de Ruogan Zhongda Wenti Fenxi [Analyses of Certain Important Issues
of Securities Legislation in China], 4 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [CHINESE AND FOREIGN LEGAL STUDIES] 97, 103 (1997).
Recently, Professor Anthony Neoh, the former President of Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission,
also noted that existing legislation in China is inadequate in dealing with parent companies which may play a
make-or-break role in listed companies. Securities Law: A Good Beginning, CHINA EcoN. REv., Mar. 1999, at 18.
204. Professor Tomasic first noticed the problem from an early draft; but the legislation went ahead without
any change. Tomasic, supra note 66, at 293-94.
205. See the report entitled The First Securities Law Adopted; MING PAO, Dec. 30, 1998, at B15. Statistics
from another source show that there are 90 securities companies today in China with combined registered
capital of RMB 19.23 billion and total net assets of RMB 212.9 billion. The total assets of these companies are
barely one tenth those of Merrill Lynch of the United States. CHINA EcoN. NEws, Dec. 14, 1998, at 7, 8.
206. See Peng and Chan, supra note 9. Recently, it has been reported that the CSRC is considering some
measures to deal with the problem, such as establishing special financial institutions to raise capital for securities
companies or allowing these companies to have access to the bond market or inter-bank borrowing market.
Meanwhile, the entire drafting group of the Securities Law now has been assigned to draft the Investment
Fund Law. MING PAO, Jan. 27, 1999, at A16.
207. See Li Changzhen, Shishi Zhengquanfa Keneng Yudao de Zuli [The Difflties May Be Encountered in Im-
plementation ofthe Securities Law]; MING PAO, Jan. 25, 1999, atB 10. Recently, the CSRC adopted some measures
to deal with the problem, including approval for securities companies to significantly increase their capital, to
pledge securities for loans, and to allow borrowing between securities companies. See the reports of Xinhua
She [Xinhua News Agency] concerning the new policy on securities finance (May 21-24, 1999) (last visited
Oct. 6, 1999) <http://www.chinainfobank.com>.
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Finally, as above mentioned, the draftsmanship also causes quite a lot of confusion. For
instance, the law includes no definitions and numerous crucial concepts are entirely left for
interpretation of the State Council and the CSRC. This approach would inevitably lead to
more government control on and involvement in the market. As compared with the IRSIT,
which has definitions for eighteen key terms, the new law appears to craft an unfinished
regime subject to extensive supplements. In this regard, it is interesting to note that recently,
two legislative bodies gave exact opposite interpretations to the term "authorization (he-
zhuen)." The drafting group of the Securities Law believes, as opposed to approval, au-
thorization refers only to procedural check; °s whereas, the Research Office of the General
Office under the Standing Committee of the NPC holds that authorization still means
strict substantive examination.2 0 9 Article 72 is another example of the poor drafting. It
forbids state officers, journalists, and other people concerned from fabricating and spreading
false information so as to seriously affect the securities trading. As such, does it follow that
the wrongdoing is permitted if the market trading is not seriously affected?
An even larger concern in this regard is that the law fails to set out its relations with
many other existing regulations. In terms of authority, the law should supersede the IRSIT
as the previous interim enactment by the State Council. However, certain issues addressed
by the IRSIT are not dealt with by the new legislation. As a result, some questions are still
open at this moment. Under Article 46 of the IRSIT, no individual may be allowed to hold
0.5 percent common stocks of any listed company. The new law, nevertheless, does not
include such a restriction. Does the deletion or omission mean that an individual may no
longer be subject to any holding limit so as to enable him to acquire a listed company? The
law seems to provide no answer. However, a negative clue in Article 82 suggests that an
acquirer be a legal person, not a natural person, because the term used in Article 82 (1) to
require the acquirer to report its name is Mingcheng, which in Chinese may only be de-
scribed for an entity's name.210 In this circumstance, it is only the legislature that should be
required to solve these puzzles. As Mr. C.Y. Leung, a partner of Baker & McKenzie, points
out, a cursory review of the new law reveals no comprehensive attempt to unify existing
regulations and clarify previous ambiguities."I l
VI. Conclusion
Re-establishment of a securities market is an important part of the bold economic reform
in China. The passage of the first Securities Law in PRC history as the product of working
and exploring for six and a half years represents the nation's firm commitment to further
develop the young market in an orderly way. However, the content of the law reflects not
only the achievements, but perhaps more continued struggles in the course of converting
a planned economy into a market economy. The dominant presence of the government,
208. LiAzHou, supra note 6, at 53.
209. WRITING GROUP OF THE RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE GENERAL OFFICE UNDER THE STANDING COMMITTEE
OF THE NPC, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHENGQAN FA YINGYONG ZHINAN [PRACTICAL GUIDE OF THE
SECURITIES LAW OF THE PRC], 75 (1999).
210. In this regard, Article 23 (1) can be taken as a comparison, which uses xingming when demanding the
filing of the name of the legal representative of the issuer. In sum, in Chinese, xingming always refers to a
natural person's name whereas mingcheng should mean a name of a legal entity.
211. See Christine Chan, Securities Law "Needs Time To Prove Itself'; SOUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec. 31,
1998, at B4.
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the lack of experience, and the considerable gap with generally accepted international prac-
tice might continue to worry and confuse investors and professionals. More importantly,
how much the limited progress may be realized in practice will depend on the enforcement
of the law,212 which has been a weak side in securities regulation in China. As such, the
legislation is more appropriately considered a stepping stone, rather than a cornerstone,
simply because the Chinese securities market and its regulations still have a long way to go
to be integrated with the international market.2' 3 The pace of the progress will depend on
further political and economic reform. However, nothing starts perfectly; the first Securities
Law will mark the history of market economy in China with its deep impact.
212. The concern has been expressed by some analysts. See Seawright, supra note 10, at B3. Based on the
observations of western securities markets, Professor Tomasic also noted that enforcement of legal rules is
subject to severe constraints due to the nature of securities market activities. Roman Tomasic, Casino Capitalism?
Insider Trading in Australia, AuSTL INST. CRIMINOLOGY (1991).
213. Mr. Li Fei, Director of the Research Office of the Legislative Affair Committee of the Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC, in his recent article agreed. He stated that the Securities Law is a piece of transitional
legislation. The law has stipulated those provisions that can be stipulated at the present stage and has left other
matters to gradual improvement in the future. See Fei, supra note 153, at 116-17. From the foreign investors'
perspective, confidence that has been drained from the industry may not be restored by a law that contains
contradictions and omissions. CHINA EcoN. REVIEw, supra note 203, at 18.
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